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**Homeland
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Statement for the Record of

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“PROGRESS OF THE DHS CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER”

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Assessment**

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Introduction

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, members of the Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to return to report on my progress during my first seven months as Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We are moving rapidly to transform the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) across a broad front.

When I appeared before you last October, I set forth five equally important priorities, which remain unchanged:

- Improving the quality of intelligence analysis across the Department;
- Integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise;
- Strengthening our support to state, local, and tribal authorities, as well as the private sector;
- Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in the Intelligence Community; and,
- Solidifying our relationship with the Congress by improving our transparency and responsiveness.

Today I will my report progress on addressing these priorities, as well as outline some specific goals for the next 6 to 12 months. But first, I would like to revisit briefly why the Department has a Chief Intelligence Officer and what my responsibilities are serving in this capacity.

You are undoubtedly aware that the guiding principle of intelligence reform since the attacks of September 11, 2001, is integration. Two major commissions—the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission—have made integration of the national intelligence community the centerpiece of their recommendations. The principal reason to integrate is to improve intelligence performance, as well as employ our scarce intelligence resources more efficiently.

These guiding principles for intelligence integration at the national level apply to integration of DHS intelligence as well. Our Department shares with others the most important mission of all—protecting the Homeland from terrorist attacks. DHS has a wide range of other critical missions, such as securing our borders and critical infrastructure against all other threats and hazards. A department with so many interconnected missions cannot succeed without a fully integrated intelligence enterprise supporting it. Just as our nation needs an integrated intelligence enterprise, so does DHS. Furthermore, by integrating its own intelligence community, DHS contributes to integration of the national intelligence community.

This thinking informed the Secretary's Second Stage Review, which resulted in, among other things, the establishment of the position of CINT. DHS Management

Directive 8110, which Secretary Chertoff signed in January, establishes the authorities of the CINT to effectively integrate and manage the Department's intelligence programs. It makes the CINT accountable for designing the DHS intelligence system to optimize the intelligence function, setting standards for functional performance, creating Department-wide policies and processes, and providing automated solutions to yield greater efficiencies.

Progress on priorities

Improving the quality of analysis

We have made significant improvements in our analysis, concentrating on issues that matter to Secretary Chertoff, our DHS leadership, and our nation. Under the leadership of my Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Dr. Mary Connell, we have changed the focus and format of key products to make them more relevant and accessible to a wider range of consumers—policymakers, operators, and other analysts—at all levels. We have increased our monthly production. In keeping with best analytic practices, we take pains to distinguish for our readers what is known from what is surmised, and we ensure fair consideration of competing hypotheses—there is no “groupthink” among my analysts. A measure of our success in improving our analysis is that we have now begun to submit intelligence articles for the *National Terrorism Bulletin* and the *President's Daily Brief*.

We continue to improve the quality of our analysis by expanding training opportunities for our analysts within the context of a DHS Intelligence Learning and Development Strategic Plan, completed in January, 2006. We are offering a full range of courses to improve our key analytic skills, including critical thinking, intelligence writing, and briefing, not only for I&A's employees, but across our DHS intelligence enterprise. I look forward to a time when our bench is full enough and deep enough to fully accommodate the need for continuous training and education without compromising our ability to fulfill our day-to-day mission.

Through the recently established Content Management Board, we are developing consensus on Department-wide standards for formatting and dissemination of intelligence products, including posting of relevant products for use by state, local, and private-sector partners. We are also recommending enhancements to DHS intelligence production and dissemination standards to achieve the highest possible quality, and we are championing “write-to-release,” tearlining, and other practices to ensure the broadest dissemination of DHS intelligence products.

Substantively, while terrorist threats and networks remain central concerns, we have broadened our focus to include potential U.S. vulnerabilities such as border and critical infrastructure security, as well as the spread of pandemic disease, which could weaken our ability to secure and protect the Homeland. Beyond these issues, we also are concerned with the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials and we are working to understand the growth and spread

of extremist ideology, which terrorists could exploit to multiply their resources and capabilities to attack the United States.

- *Border Security:* We are taking an aggressive approach to support the securing our nation's borders. We believe the threats to our security must be viewed across a spectrum of concerns—narcotics, terrorism, illegal immigration, human smuggling and trafficking, to name a few—and at the nexus of these threats. We are working tirelessly to support the intelligence and information needs of our frontline border agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
- *Critical Infrastructure:* Partnering with Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, I have strengthened the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), the linchpin in our support to the efforts of the Department and the private sector to determine the risk of attack against key infrastructure as well as the protective measures that may be taken. Additionally, at the direction of the Secretary, I&A has begun to provide intelligence support to the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS)—fulfilling a critical intelligence need to secure our homeland.
- *CBRNE:* I&A analysts provide all-source intelligence support to assist DHS customers identify, prevent, disrupt, and prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber attacks on the Homeland. They assess and forecast adversary capabilities, intent, and methods of terrorists through collaboration with DHS components—especially the Science and Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)—and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners. Outside of DHS, our analysts work closely with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and the FBI to leverage expertise and information and produce analytic products of the highest quality for the Secretary, DHS components, and governmental partners at all levels.
 - I&A provides a range of support for DNDO and helps link DNDO to the Intelligence Community. On an ongoing basis, I&A gathers and assesses intelligence reporting for situational awareness, analyzes emerging trends, incorporates DNDO's information requirements, and supports the establishment of regional centers for radiation detection support. In addition, I&A supports high-level DNDO Congressional briefs, participates in Nuclear Alarm Assessment Conferences for unresolved radiation alarms, and interfaces with DNDO's Nuclear Assessment Program.
- *Radicalization:* We have sharpened and refined our focus on radicalization, viewing it as a strategic warning issue—if we can understand the radicalization phenomenon, we can identify the root of terrorism before it matures and manifests itself in attacks against the Homeland. Working closely with selected state and local government partners across the U.S., we are examining the places where

radicalization occurs and the individuals it touches. Our efforts are coordinated with and complement the work being done by the FBI and other Intelligence Community colleagues, as well as international partners who confront similar issues. Together, we intend to develop a comprehensive understanding of the radicalization challenge.

Integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise

As I said at the outset, the role of the CINT is to integrate the DHS intelligence enterprise. In this respect, I have taken a number of important steps in fulfillment of this role, including:

- Establishing the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), consisting of the heads of the DHS component intelligence offices, to serve as my principal decision-making forum for intelligence issues of Department-wide significance;
- Developing and approving the first-ever *DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan*, which provides all DHS intelligence components with a strategic context for their operations and investments;
- Conducting a review of component intelligence programs that will result in my making substantive inputs to the Secretary's Resource Allocation Decisions—the first time this has occurred, and a major step toward treating the budget resources the Department devotes to intelligence as a coherent program;
- Through the efforts of I&A's Collection and Requirements Division, developing a Department-wide roadmap for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), ensuring that the surveillance capabilities of DHS's operating components will be employed with those of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense in national crises or natural disasters; and
- Initiating a comprehensive Intelligence Campaign Plan for Border Security, with an initial emphasis on the Southwest border, bringing the resources of both the national and Departmental intelligence communities to bear on this acute problem.

To help weld together the component parts of the DHS intelligence enterprise and bring them closer to both national and local consumers, we are designing an enterprise information architecture. Dr. Carter Morris, Director of I&A's Information Sharing and Knowledge Management Division, has developed a comprehensive assessment of the existing intelligence information technology architecture in DHS, along with recommendations to improve and enhance it. I am now reviewing this assessment. Nothing has higher priority programmatically for DHS intelligence than strengthening our ability to manage our information.

Strengthening support to state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector

DHS has a crucial responsibility to serve state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector. This set of partners is so important that I have given my Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Mr. Jack Tomarchio, the primary responsibility for enhancing our relations with them. He is my “Mr. Outside,” and his extensive travels across the country listening to state, local, tribal, and private-sector officials’ need for intelligence and information sharing have greatly enhanced our understanding of their issues, and has provided us with meaningful insights on how to better serve them. Complementing his efforts is the work of I&A’s External Relations and Law Enforcement Partners Program. This outreach team, consisting of former law enforcement and public safety officials, attends association conferences and meetings to inform state and local representatives about DHS information-sharing programs and initiatives.

Substantively, our analysts and briefers have provided immediate warning and outreach to state homeland security advisers and to other state and local officials on threat reporting.

Another important aspect of our plans to serve state, local and tribal authorities and the private sector is our plan to support the state and local fusion centers that many states and large cities are establishing. Our recently developed plan is under review by the Secretary. Meanwhile, we have deployed DHS intelligence personnel to New York, Los Angeles, Maryland, and Louisiana to improve our support in these key regions. We plan to deploy several more officers to a number of fusion centers before the end of the current fiscal year. Additionally, we have initiated a pilot program with six states—California, Arizona, Illinois, Florida, Virginia, and New York—to widen our interaction with intelligence analysts at their fusion centers via the HSIN-Intelligence portal; after further evaluation, we expect to extend this pilot program to a wider community of fusion centers.

We are also taking advantage of information technology to facilitate our outreach. We regularly hold teleconferences with state Homeland Security Advisors and other key officials at the state and local level. We have given new technical direction to the Homeland Security Information Network—Secret (HSIN-S)—which should be operational this quarter. We will extend HSIN-S to state and local fusion cells on an interim basis until a more capable system is available. Finally, we are working hard on the deployment of a more robust information handling system, the Department’s Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN).

Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in the Intelligence Community

We are also transforming our role in the national intelligence community. DHS I&A engages daily, at all levels, with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the individual Intelligence Community departments and agencies. Our collaboration with NCTC is strengthening by leaps and bounds. We have begun to

submit articles for production in the National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB) and plan to increase our NTB submissions in coming months. Last month we participated along with other Intelligence Community members in an NCTC-sponsored joint requirements review for open-source intelligence needs to complement the previous joint requirements reviews for the other intelligence collection disciplines. Additionally:

- We have worked with the ODNI to shape its budget guidance to serve better the unique needs of Homeland Security. As a result of our efforts, departments and agencies with Intelligence Community members received guidance to provide resources for the development of sensitive but unclassified (SBU) intelligence products more readily used by state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector;
- We are leading the Intelligence Community's efforts to support border security through the development of our comprehensive Intelligence Campaign Plan for border security. We are developing this plan in full partnership with the IC collection agencies and hand in hand with the staff elements of the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence for analysis, collection, and customer outcomes;
- I&A analysts have served as the functional lead for the Department's participation in the National Counterterrorism Community Terrorist Threat Warning System, and have provided consistent support to the monthly meetings of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism;
- We are engaged in a continuing and constructive dialogue with the ODNI on a wide range of issues. With DNI oversight, we are refining our roles and responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the Intelligence Community in the domain of homeland security. In particular, we are collaborating with the FBI on DHS's responsibilities for sharing information with state and local governments.
- Our relationships with other Intelligence Community organizations continue to strengthen measurably, for example, the FBI has added four intelligence analysts to its existing special-agent liaison officer team in our office. This will improve analytic collaboration between FBI and DHS and provide DHS with new and continuing database access to FBI holdings, improving our ability to provide unique information to our customers. In turn, we have announced a DHS liaison officer position to the FBI at a senior leadership level to emphasize the importance we put on this relationship.

Solidifying our relationship with Congress

Since my arrival, I have initiated briefings with members and senior staff designed to enhance awareness of threats to the Homeland and how we are reinvigorating and strengthening our overall intelligence efforts. *The Homeland Threat Stream Matrix* is a continuing and high-interest briefing that my Office provides to Congressional officials with a need to know. Additionally, senior intelligence officers from our current analysis division provide regular threat briefings to the leadership and key committees of both chambers, as well as to individual members as required. Finally, we have taken measures to ensure members and staff have access to relevant DHS intelligence products.

Cross-cutting accomplishments

I want to mention several accomplishments that do not fall neatly into one or another of my priorities but which are crucial enablers to our mission.

Open source

We have developed a concept of operations for aggressive use of open sources (OSINT) that leverages current activities of the Department, other departments and agencies including the DNI Open Source Center, the private sector, and our state and local partners in order to improve analysis and, when applicable, to protect intelligence sources and methods.

- We will gather domestic open-source information—including “gray literature”—directly, and we will purchase access to value-added collections that complement those already available to DHS through its partner departments and agencies.
- DHS officers will handle open-source information as a normal part of their everyday routine. Additionally, a cadre of specialists will support the mission needs of the Secretary and DHS components. The value provided by these specialists will include economies of scale, quality control and qualification of sources, and linkages and indexing to related open-source information as well as to intelligence and threat-advisory issuances.
- Dissemination will be both “push” and “pull.” We will use existing channels of information dissemination. Additionally, we may offer open-source information “wholesale” to authorized organizations and “retail” to selected users by direct subscription, and as a service available through a common services architecture.

Human capital

We developed and implemented a *DHS Intelligence Recruitment Strategic Plan* to bring onboard the best and brightest people fresh out of America’s universities and colleges. We have taken 30 of our positions and converted them to GS-7/9/11 levels to take advantage of the ongoing recruiting efforts and build the foundation for a sustainable

DHS intelligence enterprise. We are building a DHS Intelligence Basic Course to train our GS-7/9/11s—not only those hired by DHS I&A but by other Departmental intelligence components—to instill a true DHS intelligence culture at the beginning of our new intelligence professionals' careers.

Looking ahead 6-12 months

We have made progress but I am determined to move forward even stronger in the coming months. My agenda to continue I&A's transformation includes:

- Continuing to strengthen the quality of our analysis, focusing on training our analysts in core analytic skills, continuing to extend this training throughout the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, and tailoring our counterterrorism threat warning and assessment products more closely to our customers' requirements;
- Continuing to build our expertise in the analytic focus areas of border security, critical infrastructure, CBRNE, and radicalization, while also strengthening our intra-Departmental support;
- Enhancing intelligence support to the Department's principals through enhanced briefing programs, which capitalize on the skills and expertise of our most experienced analysts;
- Making urgently needed improvements to our I&A facilities to enhance the effectiveness and well-being of our workforce to provide our officers with critically needed information technology and workstations;
- Achieving key deliverables in our integration of the DHS intelligence enterprise, such as enhanced training efforts, a DHS intelligence officer rotation program, and strengthening our interoperability with DHS our components.
- Significantly strengthening our growing relationship with state and local authorities and the private sector, especially by increasing the interaction we have with State and Local Fusion Centers and by making more of our production available to our non-federal customers via HSIN and ultimately via HSDN; and
- Expanding relationships with our international partners, especially our closest allies. We have made progress in this area in the past six months and we must now move quickly to make further gains in our relationships with these close friends.

Conclusion

Members of the Subcommittee, I want to conclude my testimony as I did six months ago: by reminding you—and the American people you represent—that we are in a war with an adaptive enemy who means to do us grave harm. In addition, we are on watch for possible hazards to the homeland arising from illegal immigration, natural

disaster, and pandemic disease, among other things. To stay ahead of these threats, the dedicated employees of I&A have been working long, hard hours to transform the way we do business. We must be resolute in our efforts and we cannot rest. I am grateful for the support and dedication of the men and women of I&A. I am also thankful for the support I have received from the Administration, from my colleagues in the Intelligence Community, and from Congress, including the members of this Subcommittee. Our transformation at I&A is well under way, but much work remains to be completed. I look forward to this challenging work. We owe it to ourselves and we owe it to the American people.

I am eager to work with this Subcommittee to continue I&A's transformation, and I look forward to answering your questions.

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